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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INFANTS--MINOR'S LIABILITY WHEN FALSELY MISREPRESENTING
AGE-LIABILITY FOR DEPRECIATION.-Where a minor has falsely repre-
sented himself to be of legal age and thus purchased an automobile
(not a necessity), he is not estopped by such misrepresentation from
setting up his infancy in avoidance of the contract, and where the
seller takes possession of the automobile, the minor is entitled to re-
cover the amount paid by him, without diminution either for the
use of the automobile during the time he had possession of it or for
damages accruing from depreciation and wear and tear on the same.
Summit Auto Co. v. Jenkins, 20 Oh. App. 229, 153 N. E. 153 (1925).
It is held that an infant is not liable for torts arising out of
contracts. Moore v. Eastman, 1 Hun. (N. Y.) 578 (4th Dept. 1874);
Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N. E. 359
(1918). The theory being that the tort is inseparable from the con-
tract. In Miller v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 188 Mo. App. 402, 174
S. W. 166 (1915), it was held, where an infant executed an instru-
ment which recites that he is of age is not thereby estopped from relying
on infancy though he reached the age of discretion.
In New York we find a modification to the rule stated. Here
the rule is that where an infant misrepresents his age and the other
party is injured in reliance thereon, the infant will be held for his
tort. Eckstein v. Frank, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 334 (1863). A similar hold-
ing is found in other jurisdictions. Thus, in the case of Thosath v.
Transport Motor Co., 240 Pac. 921 Wash. (1925), it was held a minor
could not recover payments made on a purchase of a second-hand
automobile on the disaffirmance of his contract by him, where he de-
clared that he stood sil.ent when asked if he were of age and subse-
quently admitted that he may have said he was of age and in the written
agreement to seller, he disclosed he was twenty-two years old, such state-
ment constituting positive misrepresentation. New York went a step
further than the Eckstein case in the case of Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y.
578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899). This case directly opposes the Summit case
as to without diminution either for use of the automobile, etc. The
Rice case held that where an infant in an action to recover from
the vendor the amount paid on the contract, upon disaffirmance of the
contract he (infant) must account for the reasonable use of the bi-
cycle or its deterioration in value.
The New York rule seems to be sounder than the Ohio adjudica-
tions on two grounds. It is more equitable and there is less oppor-
tunity afforded the infant to defraud innocent merchants.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY-FINDING MOTHER RIDING IN
OWN CAR DRIVEN BY MINOR DAUGHTER RETAINED CONTROL JUSTIFIED.
-An automobile was driven by the minor daughter of the defendant
who accompanied her daughter and was present at the time of the
accident. This automobile was the property of the defendant and
her husband. Through the negligence of the minor daughter a col-
lision occurred. An action was brought against the parent on the
theory of master and servant. Judgment was given to plaintiff and
defendant appeals. Held, if the parent permits a minor child to drive
an automobile under parent's direction for parents, the defendant
parent is responsible for the negligent act of the daughter driving
the automobile, even the minor is not receiving any pay and hi the
